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I. INTRODUCTION
Mediation' and offer of judgment2 rules are procedural devices that seek
to promote settlement.3 They have generally functioned independently and
without interaction. They both have sanction regimes to enforce compliance
with their requirements, but the mediation sanction regime is quite limited,
while the offer of judgment rule sanction regime is the very centerpiece of
the procedure. The offer of judgment rule could be a useful adjunct to
mediation. For example, if there is an impasse in mediation, one party could
make an offer of settlement based on its last offer and use the leverage of the
offer of judgment rule sanctions to push the other party to settlement.4 The
other party could also counteroffer, with the possibility that the two offers
will come closer to an agreement. However, there might be concern that
mediation, as a voluntary process in which the parties cannot be required to
settle, would be undercut by combining it with the offer of judgment rule that
pressures a party to accept an offer at the risk of sanctions if it does not do
better at trial. This article examines the sanction regimes under both
* W.R. Irby Chair and Moise S. Steeg, Jr. Professor of Law, Tulane University
School of Law.
** Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law.
Mediation is not mentioned in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but many
federal district courts' local rules provide for it. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28
U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (2006), required each district court to study and develop a civil justice
"expense and delay reduction" plan, including consideration of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) programs. The most used ADR device is mediation. Elizabeth
Plapinger & Donna Stienstra, ADR and Settlement in the Federal District Courts: A
Sourcebook for Judges and Lawyers, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE
LITIGATOR's HANDBOOK 399, 406 (Nancy F. Atlas, Stephen K. Huber & E. Wendy
Trachte-Huber eds., 2000) ("Mediation has emerged as the primary ADR process in the
federal district courts.").
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 68 (Offer of Judgment).
3 Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 6 (1985). But see generally Robert G. Bone, "To
Encourage Settlement": Rule 68, Offers of Judgment, and the History of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1561 (2008) (questioning whether
settlement promotion was the principal goal of Rule 68).
4 See, e.g., Knealing v. Puleo, 675 So. 2d 593, 595-97 (Fla. 1996) (presenting an
example of use of an offer ofjudgment made after a mediation impasse).
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processes and proposes that the processes, properly used, can complement
each other with the objective of encouraging settlement.
II. A COMPARISON OF SANCTIONING REGIMES
A. The Mediation Sanction Regime
Mediation is a process by which the parties, assisted by a neutral third
person, seek to identify points of agreement and disagreement, explore
options and alternative solutions, and reach a consensual settlement of the
issues relating to their conflict. 5 A keystone of the contemporary classical
mediation model is that any agreement should be voluntarily arrived at by the
parties. This rests on the belief that the parties will be more satisfied, and
thus more likely to abide by the agreement, if it is of their own creation, and
there is evidence to support this premise. 6 Although the parties cannot be
forced to settle, the court can require parties to participate in mediation and
sanction parties for noncompliance. 7 However, courts and commentators
vary in their opinions of what constitutes noncompliance and debate the
5 ALAN ScoTr RAu, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & SCOTT R. PEPPET, PROCESSES OF
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 313-14 (4th ed. 2006).
6 Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court:
Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 11, 40-47 (1984).
7 See In re At. Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 148 (1st Cir. 2002) (upholding the inherent
power of a federal district court to order parties to participate in a non-binding mediation
and issue sanctions when parties fail to comply); G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat
Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 656-57 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding an order that the defendant was
required to send a corporate representative with authority to settle to the pretrial
conference and imposing sanctions for failure to comply). However, the more formal
summary jury trial was viewed in a different light. See Strandell v. Jackson County, 838
F.2d 884, 886-88 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that Rule 16 does not grant authority to order a
mandatory summary jury trial, and noting that it might adversely affect a party's right not
to disclose certain information in advance of trial). Contra In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154,
158 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that courts lack authority under Rule 16 to compel
participation in a summary jury trial, and noting that "compelling an unwilling litigant to
undergo this process improperly interposes the tribunal into the normal adversarial course
of litigation"); Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 448-49 (M.D. Fla.
1988) (holding that summary jury trial is a legitimate device to promote settlement).
However, the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, which authorizes district courts to make
ADR devices available and specifically mentions summary jury trial, may have resolved
the authority issue. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6)(B) (2006).
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propriety of levying sanctions for failure to comply with orders to
"participate in good faith."8
It is often said that parties cannot be required to settle in a court-ordered
settlement conference or mediation.9 However, the mediation sanction
regime extends to situations where a party fails to comply with an order that
they and their counsel attend, to bring requested documents, or to participate
in good faith at least to the extent of "minimal participation."'10 Nevertheless,
the purpose of the sanction regime is to encourage participation in a process
in which any ultimate agreement must be voluntary and not to penalize
parties for failing to settle or accept any particular offer.
Another procedural mechanism may offer more potent sanctions for
failure to settle after a mediation or judicial settlement conference. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 16 authorizes judges to order the attorneys and
unrepresented parties" to attend pretrial conferences, the purpose of which
8 For discussion in this issue, see Peter Thompson, Good Faith Mediation in the
Federal Courts, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 363 (2011); Roselle L. Wissler, Court-
Connected Settlement Procedures: Mediation and Judicial Settlement Conferences, 26
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 271, 282 (2011); Robert Rack, A Letter to My Successor, 26
OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 429 (2011).
9 G. Heileman Brewing Co., 871 F.2d at 653 ("[I]t is important to note that a district
court cannot coerce settlement." (quoting Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir.
1985))).
10 See Edward F. Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What
Form of Participation Should be Required?, 46 SMU L. REv. 2079, 2089-94 (1993).
11 For discussion of whether the parties themselves can be required to attend, even if
represented by an attorney, see G. Heileman Brewing Co., 871 F.2d at 648; Sherman,
supra note 10. Compare In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 905 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that a
government official with the ultimate authority to settle need not attend if they are fully
prepared and available by telephone at the time of the settlement conference); with In re
United States, 149 F.3d 332, 333 (5th Cir. 1998) (distinguishing Stone, and holding that it
is not an abuse of discretion to order the government to send a person with full settlement
authority to mediation); and United States v. Lake County Bd. of Comm'rs, 2:04cv 415,
2007 WL 1202408 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 19, 2007) (denying a motion to require the presence
of the Assistant Attorney General of the United States who had final settlement authority
because he oversees a staff of 300 attorneys nationwide, and his attendance can only be
practically accomplished by telephone); with Scott v. United States 552 F. Supp. 2d 917,
918-19 (D. Minn. 2008) (finding that a cap on the settlement authority of the United
States that had been imposed by Attorney General regulations was an impediment to
settlement, and that the magistrate's order requiring an Assistant Attorney General from
the Department of Justice to appear by telephone at follow-up settlement conference,
fully briefed and "prepared to participate meaningfully in settlement discussions," was
not clearly erroneous or contrary to law). A 1993 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16(c)(1) added the words "or reasonably available by other means" to the
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may be to settle the case or to use "special procedures to assist in resolving
the dispute when authorized by statute or local rule."'12 That rule also
provides for scheduling orders that require parties to meet deadlines for
discovery, motions, and "other appropriate matters. 13
The exercise of a judge's Rule 16 powers could result in an order that
requires any settlement to be made before trial or by a specified date, or else
the parties would suffer sanctions. A seminal case in this area of the law is
Kothe v. Smith, 14 a medical malpractice case in which the judge, having held
a pretrial conference at which the parties failed to settle, warned them that "if
they settled for a comparable figure after trial had begun, he would impose
sanctions against the dilatory party." 15 When the parties settled after one day
of trial, at a figure comparable to what the judge had recommended at the
settlement conference, he sanctioned the defendant. 16 The appellate court
reversed the sanction based largely on the fact that the sanction was only
imposed on the defendant and the plaintiff had not informed the defendant
that he would settle at the figure that the jury awarded.17
Kothe is often quoted for its statement that that the law "does not
sanction efforts by trial judges to effect settlements through coercion" and
that Rule 16 "was not designed as a means for clubbing the parties-or one
of them-into an involuntary compromise." 18 Nevertheless, the appellate
court did not say that a judge cannot issue an order that requires any
settlement by a certain date on threat of sanctions. The holding seemingly
relied instead on the one-sided nature of the sanctions imposed.
The case management movement 19 has presented the possibility of
sanctions for failure to settle within certain time periods under certain
situations. In Newton v. A.C. & S., Inc.,20 the trial court entered an order
setting a time limit for settlement of asbestos personal injury cases set for
provision that a court may require a party or its representative to be present at a
settlement conference. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (c)(1).
12 FED. R. Cirv. P. 16(a), (c)(2)(1).
13 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(vi).
14 Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1985).
15 Id. at 669.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 "Case management is a subcategory of judicial administration [whose goal] is to
move cases through the various pretrial stages pursuant to reasonable deadlines."
Edward F. Sherman, A Process Model and Agenda for Civil Justice Reforms in the States,
46 STAN. L. REv. 1553, 1562 (1994).
20 Newton v. A.C. & S., Inc., 918 F.2d 1121, 1124 (3d Cir. 1990).
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trial and providing a $1,000 fine if the cases were settled after such a date.
Although the lower court found that the fixed fine was arbitrary, the appellate
court concluded that Rule 16 provided authority for such a program:
Rule 16 does not specifically grant authority to the district
court to impose sanctions for settling after a certain date. However,
imposing sanctions for unjustified failure to comply with the
court's schedule for settlement is entirely consistent with the spirit
of Rule 16. The purpose of Rule 16 is to maximize the efficiency
of the court system by insisting that attorneys and clients cooperate
with the court and abandon practices which unreasonably interfere
with the expeditious management of cases....
The intent and spirit of Rule 16 is to allow courts to actively
manage the timetable of case preparation so as to expedite the
speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the imposition of sanctions for
failure to comply with a settlement schedule is entirely consistent
with the purpose of Rule 16.21
This extension of sanctions is particularly related to the management of a
large number of similar cases which flood a court's docket and interfere with
their timely resolution. It is not directly related to mediation and has to be
seen as simply another settlement sanction regime.
The scope of a judge's authority to impose sanctions for failure to settle
within a certain time period is not entirely clear under the case law, but
obvious factors to be drawn from Kothe and Newton are that imposition of
sanctions should be used sparingly and even-handedly and that docket
pressures may particularly justify their use. However, such sanction orders
are not common, and although they may provide an additional form of
pressure to settle, such pressure, tied to a schedule, is quite different from
sanctions for failure adequately to participate in a mediation or judicial
settlement conference.
B. The Federal Rule 68 Sanction Regime
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 and equivalent rules under state court
procedures allow a defendant to make an offer of judgment to a plaintiff, and
if the plaintiff does not accept and the judgment finally obtained is not more
favorable than the offer, to require the plaintiff to pay the costs the defendant
21 Id. at 1126.
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incurred following the offer.22 This provides an incentive to accept an offer
rather than risk cost-shifting. This goes far beyond the scope of the mediation
sanction regime. It requires the plaintiff to consider an offer and, if the
plaintiff refuses the offer, to do better at trial or suffer sanctions.23 While
there is no obligation in mediation to respond to a specific offer or to agree to
a settlement based on that offer, the offer of judgment rule pressures a party
to accept that offer on risk of cost-shifting.
The offer of judgment rule embodied in Federal Rule 68 has never quite
caught on as a settlement tool. Quite simply, both anecdotal and empirical
evidence show that lawyers rarely use Federal Rule 68.24 A number of
reasons have been advanced for its underutilization. These range from
ignorance of the rule itself to inherent limitations in its provisions and
uncertainty in its application.
Although Rule 68 has been part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
since 1938, one reason advanced for its lack of use is that the practicing bar
is simply ignorant as to its operation and its value as a settlement tool.25 A
corollary complaint is that the rule's own terminology is a limiting factor.
Federal Rule 68's use of the term "offer of judgment" is criticized as off-
putting to some litigants.26 A typical privately negotiated settlement would
include a non-admission of liability and likely a confidentiality provision. In
contrast, a judgment is considered a formal public declaration of wrongdoing
that clients want to avoid for various reasons. Concerns over copycat
22 Edward F. Sherman, From "Loser Pays" to Modified Offer of Judgment Rules:
Reconciling Incentives to Settle with Access to Justice, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1863, 1874
(1998).
23 See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 6 (1985).
24 Danielle M. Shelton, Rewriting Rule 68: Realizing the Benefits of the Federal
Settlement Rule by Injecting Certainty into Offers of Judgment, 91 MINN. L. REv. 865,
872 (2007) ("Indeed, the anecdotal evidence and empirical research on Rule 68
demonstrates that the rule is used infrequently .... "); see Symposium, Revitalizing
FRCP 68: Can Offers of Judgment Provide Adequate Incentives for Fair, Early
Settlement of Fee-Recovery Cases?, 57 MERCER L. REv. 743, 757 (2006) ("In summary,
with some notable exceptions, it appears that Rule 68 is not used very much in the very
type of cases in which it might be expected to have the greatest impact."); John E.
Shapard, Likely Consequences of Amendments to Rule 68, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 1995 FED. JUDICIAL CTR. 89 (1995), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ru le68.pdf/$file/rule68.pdf (noting that based
on a survey of 800 federal civil cases, Rule 68 offers were made in 24% of civil rights
cases that settled and were made in only 12% of civil rights cases that went to trial).
25 See Shelton, supra note 24, at 876 n.51.
26 See Symposium, supra note 24 at 754 ("Probably the most common explanation
provided concerned problems associated with the word 'judgment.').
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litigation, adverse publicity, and negative career impact make defendants
wary of the offer of judgment. 27 It is suggested that the phrase "offer of
settlement" might be more palatable.28
The Advisory Committee also identifies two inherent limitations with
Federal Rule 68. First, it is a unilateral rule, only "a party defending against a
claim" can take advantage of the rule's provisions. 29 By limiting the
application to defendants, Federal Rule 68 prohibits the potential benefits of
its provisions from an entire class of litigant-plaintiffs. 30
A second inherent limitation in Federal Rule 68 is the limited scope of its
sanction. If a plaintiff rejects the offer of judgment and the judgment finally
obtained is not more favorable, the plaintiff must pay the costs incurred by
the defendant after the offer.31 Typically, costs in federal litigation are
limited to those items taxable as costs under Federal Rule 54(d). 32 The
relatively small amounts counted as costs minimize the incentive for both a
defendant to offer and a plaintiff to accept an offer of judgment. The stakes
are simply not high enough to influence party decisionmaking. By limiting
the focus to shifting post-offer costs, Federal Rule 68 limits its own
27 See id. (describing disincentives to defendants to agree to judgments); Ian H.
Fisher, Using Federal Rule 68 to Spur Settlement, 89 ILL. B.J. 143, 143 (Mar. 2001)
(describing adverse publicity as a factor to consider with Rule 68).
28 See Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Thomas A. Eaton, The Contours of a New FRCP, Rule
68.1: A Proposed Two- Way Offer of Settlement Provision for Federal Fee-Shifting Cases,
252 F.R.D. 551, 556 (2009).
29 See FED. R. Civ. P. 68(a).
30 The Advisory Committee noted that Federal Rule 68 is ineffective because its
sanctions are available only to the party defending against a claim and not to claimants,
thus, effectively preventing plaintiffs from invoking Federal Rule 68. See Preliminary
Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 337,
363 (1983) (proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 advisory committee note on the 1983
amendment).
31 See FED. R. Civ. P. 68(d).
32 If costs are to be awarded under Federal Rule 54(d), they likely will include at
least the six items listed in Section 1920 of the Judicial Code. These include: (1) Fees of
the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic
transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) Fees and disbursements for printing
and witnesses; (4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for
use in the case; (5) Docket fees; and (6) Compensation of court appointed experts,
compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special
interpretation services. 10 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY
KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2670 (3d ed. 2010).
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effectiveness. 33
While post-offer costs are likely to be small sums, post-offer attorney's
fees are a different story. Even though attorney's fees are not considered
"costs" in typical federal litigation, the Supreme Court interprets Federal
Rule 68 to include attorney's fees as costs if there is an underlying federal
statute that defines attorney's fees as part of costs. 34 For example, the United
States Congress provides that in all federal civil rights actions the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party to collect reasonable attorney's
fees as part of the costs. 35 Consequently, in a civil rights lawsuit such as one
under § 1983, the fee-shifting provision allowing the prevailing party to
recover attorney's fees as "costs," bootstraps attorney's fees into the Federal
Rule 68 equation. In the context of a Federal Rule 68 offer of judgment in a §
1983 case, the stakes for the plaintiff are magnified. At risk are not only the
typical post-offer costs, but post-offer attorney's fees as well.36 The inclusion
of attorney's fees into the Federal Rule 68 calculus in only certain types of
cases adds another layer of complication to the operation of the rule. This is
aggravated by the lack of guidance the rule itself provides on this issue.
Indeed, there is nothing in the text of Federal Rule 68 that alerts counsel to
the importance of this buried issue. Thus, uncertainty as to Federal Rule 68's
application to attorney's fees in specific cases may contribute to its
underutilization. 37
33 The Advisory Committee also noted the cost limitation as a primary limitation on
Federal Rule 68's effectiveness. See supra note 30, proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 68 advisory
committee note.
34 City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 580 (1986) ("Furthermore, we have
held that a civil rights defendant is not liable for attorney's fees incurred after a pretrial
settlement offer, where the judgment recovered by the plaintiff is less than the offer.");
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) (holding that where the judgment for a plaintiff
was less favorable than a defendant's offer, it was a defendant's right under Federal Rule
68 to recover "costs" incurred after the offer included plaintiffs attorney's fees under the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, which awards attorney's fees to a
prevailing party as part of costs). But see Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Commc'ns, Inc., 158
F.3d 1074 (10th Cir. 1998) (distinguishing Marek in a Title VII employment
discrimination case as the provision in Title VII for recovery of attorney's fees by a
prevailing plaintiff was amended in 1991 to avoid the application of Marek).
35 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006).
36 See, e.g., Bogan v. City of Boston, 432 F. Supp. 2d 222, 228-35 (D. Mass. 2006)
(finding that a civil rights defendant is not liable for attorney's fees incurred after a
Federal Rule 68 offer where the judgment obtained by the plaintiff was for less than the
offer).
37 See Shelton, supra note 24, at 897-915 (describing various sources of confusion
surrounding attorney's fees and Rule 68).
334
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While much of the uncertainty in Federal Rule 68 litigation surrounds
recovery of attorney's fees as costs or otherwise, additional uncertainties also
serve to limit its usefulness. There is confusion concerning the validity of
offers that disclaim liability, or that are revoked, or that offer the plaintiff
incomplete relief.38 There is confusion surrounding offers using "with costs"
language and whether this means the offer is inclusive of costs or for a
certain sum plus costs. 39 Additional confusion occurs when an offer does not
mention costs. Absent guidance from Federal Rule 68 itself, these festering
uncertainties exact a toll: defendants are either reluctant to make offers of
judgment for fear of being blindsided by an ambiguity or they draft offers
that produce unintended results.40 The irony is that the rule designed to foster
settlement can actually spawn additional litigation.
Federal Rule 68 would be much more effective in encouraging settlement
if, as has often been proposed but never adopted, it had been amended to
allow plaintiffs to make an offer of judgment and if the sanctions included
attorney's fees. Some states already extend the right to make an offer to
plaintiffs and allow the recovery of attorney's fees.41 Throughout the first
half of the 1980s, there were proposals to change Federal Rule 68, generally
designed to make the rule bilateral (i.e., to allow plaintiffs to make such
offers as well), to provide explicitly for fee-shifting in some situations, and to
limit shifting to cases in which a party unreasonably rejected an offer.42
The United States House of Representatives passed a modified offer of
judgment rule in 1995 as part of the Republican Party's "Contract with
America."43 Dubbed "loser pays," it would have allowed either party to make
38 See id. at 881-88.
39 See Teresa R. Bult, Practical Use and Risky Consequences of Rule 68 Offers of
Judgment, LITIGATION 26, at 28 (Apr. 2007).
40 See Shelton, supra note 24, at 916-18.
41 See infra Part III.B (describing bilateral jurisdictions) and Part IlI.C (describing
jurisdictions including attorney's fees).
42 For an examination of the reform movement, see generally Roy D. Simon, The
Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1985). Further proposals for reform have
been made. See William W. Schwarzer, Fee-Shifting Offers of Judgment-An Approach
to Reducing the Cost of Litigation, 76 JUDICATURE 147, 147 (1992); Thomas Rowe &
Neal Vidmar, Empirical Research on Offers of Settlement: A Preliminary Report, 51
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13 (1988).
43 The "Contract with America" set forth ten legislative initiatives to be proposed
within the first 100 days of 104th Congress to advance the conservative cause of civil
justice. See Linda S. Mullinex, Strange Bedfellows: The Politics of Preemption, 59 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 837, 850 (2009). The Contract with America included "The Common
Sense Legal Reforms Act" which proposed several methods to curb the presumed
excesses and abuses of the overly-litigious American society including awarding
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an offer and, if the offer was refused and the ultimate judgment was not more
favorable than the offer, the offeree would have to pay the offeror's costs,
including attorney's fees.44 This bill was not enacted. However, this led the
American Bar Association to convene a task force to study the issue in light
of expressed concerns that the bill would disproportionately impact plaintiffs
who would be deterred from seeking access to the courts by the risk of
having to pay the defendants' attorney's fees.45 The task force concluded that
allowing attorney's fees to be shifted, under an offer of judgment rule, could
promote settlement, but that safeguards were needed to mitigate the
disproportionate adverse effect upon plaintiffs. 46 The task force proposed a
rule that included a fee-shifting formula that gave an offeree a margin of
error of 25% before cost-shifting was triggered by not doing as well as the
ultimate judgment obtained. The proposal also limited liability for the
offeror's attorney's fees to an amount equal to the offeree's attorney's fees
and gave the court discretion to reduce or eliminate cost-shifting to avoid
undue hardship.47
III. STATE EXPERIENCE WITH OFFER OF JUDGMENT RULES
A. States Following the Federal Model
Federal Rule 68 has remained essentially unchanged since the
promulgation of the Federal Rules in 1937 and has served as a model for the
states. Following the federal model, most states adopted an offer of judgment
attorney's fees to the prevailing party in federal civil diversity litigation. Common Sense
Legal Reforms Act of 1995, H.R. 10, 104 th Cong. § 101 (1995). The concept resurfaced
in a bill creating an offer-of-judgment device for diversity cases passed by the House of
Representatives in March 1995. Attorney Accountability Act of 1995, H.R. 988, 104
th
Cong. § 2 (1995).
44 Attorney Accountability Act of 1995, supra note 43.
45 A.B.A. House of Delegates, Resolution, 1996.
46 Id.
47 A.B.A. Report on Offer-of-Judgment Legislation, Sec. Torts & Ins. Prac., Offer of
Judgment Procedure (Feb. 1996), published as an appendix in Sherman, supra note 22, at
1892-1896. Neither the House bill nor the ABA proposal became law. "Loser pays"
proposals continue to be proposed by business interests. See Marie Gryphon, Greater
Justice, Lower Cost: How a 'Loser Pays' Rule Would Improve the American Legal
System, 11 CIV. JUST. REP. 1 (2008), available at http://www.manhattan-
institute.org/html/cjrl 1.htm (this proposal from the Manhattan Institute for Policy
Research was endorsed by former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani).
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rule that mirrored Federal Rule 68.48 By 1997, twenty-nine states and the
District of Columbia had rules identical or substantially similar to Federal
Rule 68. 49 Thirteen jurisdictions departed from the federal model in a
significant way; nine states had no provision at all.50 Today, Federal Rule 68
no longer dominates the offer of judgment landscape with states abandoning
the language of Federal Rule 68 in large numbers. By 2009, twenty-three
states departed from the federal model in a significant way.51 These
jurisdictions embrace many of the changes suggested by critics of the federal
offer of judgment formula and advance additional provisions designed to
encourage settlement through the offer of judgment concept.52
B. Creating a Two-Way Street
The most significant departure by state offer of judgment rules from
Federal Rule 68 is that twenty-three states now allow both parties to make
offers of judgment. 53 Minnesota illustrates the transformation from unilateral
48 Albert Yoon & Tom Baker, Offer-of-Judgment Rules and Civil Litigation: An
Empirical Study ofAutomobile Insurance Litigation in the East, 59 VAND. L. REv. 155,
157 (2006) ("Most states subsequently adopted their own offer-of-judgment rule; the vast
majority of these rules were modeled after the federal version.").
49 Sherman, supra note 22, at 1874 ("Today twenty-nine states and the District of
Columbia have rules similar in language and effect to Rule 68.").
50 See Michael E. Solimine & Bryan Pacheco, State Court Regulation of Offers of
Judgment and its Lessons for Federal Practice, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 51, 64
(1997) ("By our account, about twenty-eight states (including a majority of the federal
replica jurisdictions), plus the District of Columbia, have provisions identical or
substantially similar to Federal Rule 68. Another thirteen states have provisions which
depart from the Federal Rule in significant ways, while nine states apparently have no
provision at all.").
51 William P. Lynch, Rule 68 Offers of Judgment: Lessons from the New Mexico
Experience, 39 N.M. L. REv. 349, 355 (2009) ("The trend away from Rule 68 has
accelerated since that time. By my count, twenty-three states now allow all parties to
make offers of judgment. Nine of those states shift attorney's fees as a sanction for failing
to receive a judgment that exceeds an offer of judgment.").
52 See infra Part III.B. As state offer ofjudgment rules depart from Federal Rule 68,
federal courts must decide which controls in diversity cases. In a recent appeal in a
diversity case, the Tenth Circuit compared an Oklahoma offer ofjudgment statute with
Federal Rule 68 and concluded that they "do not collide" and "can exist side by side"
with each controlling its "own sphere of coverage without conflict." See Scottsdale Ins.
Co. v. Tolliver, No. 09-5150, 2011 WL 652459, at *3 (10th Cir. Feb. 24, 2011). Had the
court concluded that there was a conflict, traditional Erie analysis would have determined
whether the state statute or federal procedural law applied.
53 Id.
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to bilateral application. Prior to 1985, Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 68
was similar to Federal Rule 68. 54 Amendments in 1985 extended the offer of
judgment or settlement to both plaintiffs and defendants. 55 Minnesota Rule
68 was then completely revised in 2008.56 The goal of the 2008 amendments
was to add certainty to the operation of the rule and to remove surprises both
to parties making offers and those receiving and deciding whether to accept
them. 57 Additionally, Minnesota Rule 68 was revised to better address the
goal of providing incentives for both claimants and parties opposing
claims.58 Consequently, Minnesota Rule 68 no longer closely resembles its
federal counterpart.
The basic premise of Minnesota Rule 68 is similar to the federal rule in
shifting the burden of costs and disbursements if an offeree does not do better
at trial.59 Costs in this context refer only to taxable costs under Minnesota
Rule 54, and not necessarily attorney's fees. 60 Amendments in 2008 clarified
that attorney's fees may be included as "costs" in a Minnesota Rule 68 offer
of judgment when the attorney's fees are awardable to a prevailing party
pursuant to a statute.61 Minnesota Rule 68 also includes a new provision that
requires that an offer include express reference to the rule in order to be
given the cost-shifting effect of the rule.62 This provision was intended to
54 Jennifer E. Ampulski, Offers of Judgment & Rule 68, BENCH & B. MINN., Apr.
2008, at 32.
55 Id.
56 See DAvID F. HERR & ROGER S. HAYDOCK, 2A MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES:
CIVIL RULES ANNOTATED, § 68.2 (4th ed. 2010).
57 See id. § 68.1.
58 See MINN. R. Civ. P. 68.04, advisory committee comment.
59 See MINN. R. Civ. P. 68.01-68.04; HERR & HAYDOCK, supra note 56, § 68.3.
60 See HERR & HAYDOCK, supra note 56, § 68.4.
61 "'Applicable attorney fees' for purposes of Rule 68 means any attorney fees to
which a party is entitled by statute, common law, or contract for one or more of the
claims resolved by an offer made under the rule. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to
create a right to attorney fees not provided for under the applicable substantive law."
MNN. R. Civ. P. 68.04(a). Additionally, the rule, as amended in 2008, now specifically
applies to costs and disbursements that will be awarded after the offer of judgment or
settlement was made. MINN. R. Civ. P. 68.03(b). Prior to amendment, Minnesota Rule 68
was interpreted to include the total costs and disbursements incurred from the beginning
of the lawsuit. See Vandenheuvel v. Wagner, 690 N.W.2d 753, 757 (Minn. 2005)
(affirming the court of appeals' determination that where an offer of judgment is made
and rejected by an offeree, and the net judgment is less favorable to the offeree than the
offer, the offeree must pay all of the offeror's costs and disbursements, not only those
costs and disbursements incurred after the offer was made).
62 MINN. R. CIv. P. 68.0 1(b).
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eliminate surprises by making it unlikely that an offer would come within the
scope of the rule without the offeror intending it to do so and the offeree
having notice that the offer was being made pursuant to Minnesota Rule 68.63
Minnesota Rule 68 allows both parties to use the cost-shifting procedure
by permitting either to make an offer of judgment or settlement.64 The offer
of settlement differs from the offer of judgment in that it does not result
immediately in an entry of judgment for the amount of the offer.65 A party
may accept an offer of settlement without disclosing the terms of the
settlement.66 By making available to both parties, the drafters hoped to
encourage settlement in situations where the parties were not likely to want a
judgment entered as a matter of public record.67
Not only does Minnesota permit offers of judgment or settlement,
Minnesota Rule 68.01 now recognizes two types of offers: "damages-only"
offers and "total-obligation" offers.68 A "damages-only" offer does not
include then-accrued applicable prejudgment interest, costs and
disbursements, or applicable attorney's fees, all of which are to be added to
the amount as provided by the rule.69 A "total-obligation" offer includes
then-accrued applicable prejudgment interest, costs and disbursements, and
63 See Ampulski, supra note 54, at 33.
64 See MINN. R. CIv. P. 68.01(a).
65 See MiNN. R. Civ. P. 68.02(c).
66 See HERR & HAYDOCK, supra note 56, § 68.12.
67 See id.
68 MINN. R. Civ. P. 68.01(c)-(d). This bifurcation of offers is intended to remove a
significant "trap for the unwary" where an accepted offer may be given two substantially
different interpretations by offeror and offeree. Ampulski, supra note 54, at 32. Before
the amendment, lawyers handling cases where a separate statutory basis existed for the
recovery of attorney's fees had to be especially careful with offers of judgment.
Minnesota courts allowed the recovery of attorney's fees as an amount over and above
the amount contained in the offer of judgment in claims brought under certain statutes.
See, e.g., Collins v. Minn. Sch. of Bus., Inc., 655 N.W.2d 320, 330 (Minn. 2003).
Similarly, lawyers in a litigated case in which there exists a contractual basis for
attorney's fees had to be careful with drafting and accepting offers. In Schwickert, Inc. v.
Winnebago Seniors, Ltd., 680 N.W.2d 79, 88 (Minn. 2004), the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that an offer of judgment resolved all contractual claims, including attorney's
fees which were provided for in the underlying contract, where the offer of judgment was
intended to resolve all claims and the offer did not specify that the offer amount excluded
attorney's fees. Similar uncertainty existed as to whether prejudgment interest was
included in the amount of an offer. See, e.g., Stinson v. Clark Equip. Co., 473 N.W.2d
333, 335 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
69 MINN. R. CIv. P. 68.01(c).
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applicable attorney's fees.70 The bifurcation of offers into these two
categories allows the party making the offer to control and understand what
costs are shifted.71 Similarly, a party deciding how to respond to an offer
should be able to determine the total cost of accepting an offer. Presumably,
the added precision allowed by distinguishing the types of offers permits
Minnesota Rule 68 to provide greater clarity and certainty to the effect both
of accepted offers and unaccepted offers.72
Minnesota Rule 68 clearly describes the consequences that flow from the
acceptance and rejection of offers of judgment or settlement. 73 If the offer
accepted is an offer of judgment, the court orders an entry of judgment based
upon whether it was a "damages-only" or "total-obligation" offer.74 If the
offer accepted is an offer of settlement, the settled claims are dismissed upon
the filing of a stipulation of dismissal.75
In the case of rejected offers, if the offeror is a defendant, and the
defendant-offeror prevails or the relief awarded to the plaintiff-offeree is less
favorable than the offer, the plaintiff-offeree must pay the defendant-
offeror's costs and disbursements incurred in the defense of the action after
service of the offer.76 Also, the plaintiff-offeree may not recover its costs and
disbursements incurred after service of the offer.77 Minnesota Rule
68.03(b)(1) further provides that applicable attorney's fees available to the
plaintiff-offeree are not affected by this provision.78 In this respect,
70 M NN. R. Cfv. P. 68.01(d).
71 See MINN. R. Civ. P. 68.04, advisory committee comment.
7 2 Id.
73 MiNN. R. Civ. P. 68.02(b)-(c).
74 If the offer is a total-obligation offer, judgment shall be for the amount of the
offer. MINN. R. Civ. P. 68.02(b)(1). If the offer is a damages-only offer, applicable
prejudgment interest, the plaintiff-offeree's costs and disbursements, and applicable
attorney's fees, all as accrued to the date of the offer, shall be determined by the court
and included in the judgment. MINN. R. Civ. P. 68.02(b)(2).
75 MINN. R. Civ. P. 68.02(c). A stipulation of dismissal states that the terms of the
offer, including payment of applicable prejudgment interest, costs and disbursements, and
applicable attorney's fees, all accrued to the date of the offer, have been satisfied or by
order of the court implementing the terms of the agreement. Id. In practice, if the offer is
accepted it is usually not necessary for the court administrator to enter judgment, as the
parties will then consummate the transaction as any other settlement, and will simply file
a dismissal of the action when payment and releases have been exchanged. See HERR &
HAYDOCK, supra note 56, § 68.8.
7 6 MINN. R. CIv. P. 68.03(b)(1).
77 Id.
78 Id.
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Minnesota Rule 68 does not incorporate the cutoff of attorney's fees that
occurs under Federal Rule 68 as interpreted in Marek.79
Minnesota Rule 68.03 introduces a new consequence for a defendant's
rejection of a plaintiffs offer if the ultimate judgment is less favorable to the
defendant-offeree--double costs.80 If the offeror is a plaintiff, and the relief
awarded is less favorable to the defendant-offeree than the offer, the
defendant-offeree must pay, in addition to the costs and disbursements to
which the plaintiff-offeror is entitled under Minnesota Rule 54.04, an amount
equal to the plaintiff-offeror's offeror's costs and disbursements incurred
after service of the offer.81 Again, applicable attorney's fees available to the
plaintiff are unaffected by Minnesota Rule 68.03.82 Thus, this provision
requires the defendant to pay double the offeror's costs and disbursements
incurred after service of the offer. 83 Minnesota Rule 68 also now includes a
hardship exception. If the court determines that the obligations imposed
under the rule as a result of a party's failure to accept an offer would impose
undue hardship or otherwise be inequitable, the court may reduce the amount
of the obligations in order to eliminate the undue hardship or inequity.84
Despite the 2008 amendments, Minnesota continues to experience only
limited use of offers of judgment or settlement. The primary reason advanced
79 See supra text accompanying notes 34-36 (describing Marek's impact).
80 MiNN. R. Civ. P. 68.03.
81 MINN. R. Civ. P. 68.03(b)(2).
82 Id.
83 Prior to this 2008 amendment, there was little incentive for plaintiffs to make
Minnesota Rule 68 offers and for defendants to accept Minnesota Rule 68 offers because
a prevailing plaintiff would receive costs from the defendant under Rule 54 regardless.
See MINN. R. Civ. P. 68.04, advisory committee comment. If the defendant is merely
required to pay the offeror's costs, there is no adverse consequence for a defendant who
rejects a Minnesota Rule 68 offer. This provision attempts to balance the incentive
structure to encourage plaintiff use. Ampulski, supra note 54, at 33. This provision has
been criticized as allowing double-recovery to plaintiffs without sufficient justification
and creating the potential for plaintiffs to game the process by making an early offer to
create a potential cost windfall. Id.
84 MINN. R. Civ. P. 68.03(b)(3). This provision has been criticized as providing an
exception that will primarily favor individual plaintiffs over defendants. Ampulski, supra
note 54, at 33. Minnesota Rule 68 also provides clarity on how to determine if the relief
awarded is less favorable to the offeree than the offer under the bifurcated offer scheme.
A damages-only offer is compared with the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff.
MINN. R. Civ. P. 68.03(c)(1). A total-obligation offer is compared with the amount of
damages awarded to the plaintiff, plus applicable prejudgment interest, the plaintiffs
taxable costs and disbursements, and applicable attorney's fees, all as accrued since the
date of the offer. MINN. R. Civ. P. 68.03(c)(2).
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for the limited use is that Minnesota Rule 68 continues to shift only costs and
disbursements. 85 As with federal cases, total costs and disbursements in most
Minnesota state court lawsuits do not constitute a substantial amount of
money. Moreover, the rule only shifts taxable costs and disbursements
incurred after the offer of settlement or judgment is made. 86 Thus, the
incentive for settlement intended by the rule is not realized in practice. While
the latest incarnation of Minnesota Rule 68 now equalizes the incentive
between plaintiffs and defendants to use the rule, it does not alter the
inherently limiting focus on post-offer costs.
Minnesota Rule 68 is also underutilized because of its lack of impact on
attorney's fees. 87 While a total-obligation offer can include attorney's fees, a
defendant cannot avoid the obligation to pay a plaintiffs attorney's fees if
required by law.88 For example, if a plaintiff rejects a total-obligation offer
and ultimately recovers less at trial, the plaintiff must pay the defendant-
offeror's costs incurred after service of the offer and the plaintiff-offeree
cannot recover its costs incurred.8 9 But as to attorney's fees, the prevailing
plaintiff is still entitled to its attorney's fees from the defendant.90 If
Minnesota Rule 68 permitted a party to avoid paying attorney's fees, it would
certainly see greater use. Such a change seems unlikely. In 1985, the
Advisory Committee considered including attorney's fees within the
operation of the rule, but determined that such radical change was
undesirable. 91
C. Inclusion of Attorney's Fees
Nine states put more bite into their offer of judgment rules by
incorporating attorney's fees.92 New Jersey, a vanguard jurisdiction on this
issue, has included attorney's fees in its offer of judgment rule since it
85 See HERR & HAYDOCK, supra note 56, § 68.1.
86 Id.
87 See HERR & HAYDOCK, supra note 56, § 68.3.
88 MINN. R. Civ. P. 68.04, advisory committee comment.
89 See MINN. R. Crv. P. 68.03(b)(1).
90 See id.; MmNN. R. Civ. P. 68.04, advisory committee comment ("The revised rule
provides that the offeree does not recover its costs and disbursements incurred after
service of the offer. But this change does not affect a prevailing plaintiff's right to
attorney fees to which it is entitled under law or contract.").
91 See HERR & HAYDOCK, supra note 56, § 68.3.
92 Lynch, supra note 51, at 355.
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adopted the rule in 1971. 93 However, attorney's fees were capped at $750.94
With no provision to adjust the cap for inflation, this limitation quickly
erased any benefit from its inclusion.95 In 1994, the New Jersey Supreme
Court adopted a revised rule eliminating the cap.96 Recent empirical work by
Albert Yoon and Tom Baker has focused on the effect that removal of the
limitation has had on attorney's fees on insurance-based litigation in New
Jersey. Yoon & Baker conclude:
Our results show that the revision of [New Jersey] Rule
4:58 appears to have had a discernable effect on insurance-
based litigation. In the aftermath of the revision of the offer-
of-judgment rule, which abolished the $750 cap on attorneys'
fees as a cost-shifting measure, the average duration of
litigation decreased in New Jersey relative to the neighboring
control states by 7 percent (2.3 months) on average.
Correspondingly, the amount that Insurer X spent on its own
attorneys' fees in New Jersey decreased on average by a
relative margin of 20 percent ($1,173). Both of these
reductions were statistically significant. At the same time,
damage awards, which had a modest relative decrease in New
Jersey, did not change in any statistically significant amount.97
While extrapolation of their findings must proceed cautiously, Yoon and
Baker's results support an important premise surrounding use of offers of
judgment. A credible cost-shifting mechanism is necessary to influence pre-
trial negotiations.98 New Jersey lacked such a mechanism until the removal
of the attorney's fees cap. Thus, cost-shifting that includes attorney's fees
appears to be a credible method for influencing litigant behavior in this
context.
An expanded offer of judgment rule has been part of the "tort reform"
proposals urged by business interests in many states.99 The most sweeping
93 See Yoon & Baker, supra note 48, at 163.
94 See id. at 164.
95 See id.
96 Id,
97 Yoon & Baker, supra note 48, at 185-86.
98 Id. at 192.
99 See Linda S. Mullinex, The Future of Tort Reform: Possible Lessons From the
World Trade Center Victim Compensation Fund, 53 EMORY L.J. 1315, 1327-28 (2004).
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was passed and signed into law in Texas in 2004.100 It allows claimants or
defendants to make offers and provides for the shifting of litigation expenses,
including attorney's fees, fees of two testifying expert witnesses, and post-
rejection litigation costs when the judgment is less favorable to the offeree by
at least 20%.101 The Texas Supreme Court has adopted rules implementing
this procedure. 102
Unlike the New Jersey experience, the new Texas scheme appears to
have had little effect on civil litigation. Practitioners simply have not flocked
to the new rule. 103 To date, there are no reported cases interpreting the offer
of settlement statutory scheme. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it is rarely
used. This is due to the fact that the offer of settlement statutory scheme is so
complicated that it is hard to predict what effect it will have in a case. 104
Even the sponsor of the legislation, former Texas State Representative Joe
Nixon, now contends that the offer of settlement statute was not meant to be
used frequently, but rather it was designed for a situation in which it is clear
the defense is liable, but the plaintiff was making unreasonable settlement
demands. 10 5 Apparently, any incentive generated by inclusion of attorney's
fees in the offer of judgment rule can be outweighed by the uncertainty
produced by an overly complicated rule.
D. Rejection of Offer of Judgment Cost-Shifting
Not all states embrace the cost-shifting premise of offer of judgment
rules. Prior to the adoption of the Ohio Civil Rules, the Ohio Revised Code
provided that a party who refused an offer of judgment could be held
responsible for costs incurred after the making of the offer if the subsequent
judgment was less favorable than the offer.106 These statutory provisions
100 See Elaine A. Carlson, The New Texas Offer-of-Settlement Practice-The Newest
Steps in the Tort Reform Dance, 46 S. TEX. L. REv. 733, 735-36 (2005).
101 See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 42.001-42.005 (Vernon 2008);
ELAINE A. CARLSON GRAFTON, 3 MCDONALD & CARLSON TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE, §§
17.32-17.36 (2009) (describing the new process).
102 See TEX. R. Civ. P. 167.1-167.7.
103 Elaine A. Carlson, The New Texas Offer of Settlement Practice-The Newest
Steps in the Tort Reform Dance, 44 THE ADvoc. (TEXAS) 104, 114 (2008) ("Practitioners
have not embraced the Texas offer-of-settlement statutory scheme and wisely are
reluctant to gamble by invoking Rule 167.").
104 Id. at 104.
105 Id. (citing John Council, The Perils of Loser Pays: H.B. 4 Rule Unpopular With
Defense Lawyers, 20 TEX. LAW. 1 (2004)).
106 See JAMES M. KLEIN & STANTON G. DARLING II, 2 BALDWIN'S OH. PRACTICE:
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essentially codified the federal offer of judgment rule. In 1970, Ohio adopted
Ohio Rule 68 explicitly rejecting Federal Rule 68's cost-shifting provision.
Ohio Rule 68 provides: "An offer of judgment by any party, if refused by an
opposite party, may not be filed with the court by the offering party for
purposes of a proceeding to determine costs." 10 7 Ohio Rule 68 effectively
repealed the earlier statutory provisions.10 8
Interestingly, the rationale for rejecting Federal Rule 68 was to increase
settlements. According to the Staff Notes:
Offers of settlement are encouraged by Rule 68 at all stages of
an action in the interest of voluntary resolution of litigation.
However, under Rule 68 an offer of judgment may no longer be
used in a proceeding to determine costs. The use of offers of
judgment as the basis of costs proceedings has in the past often had
a one-sided, coercive effect. Therefore, Federal Rule 68, permitting
the use of an offer of judgment as the basis of a costs proceeding,
has not been adopted. 109
Ohio Rule 68 reiterates its role in encouraging settlement by noting that
"[t]his rule shall not be construed as limiting voluntary offers of settlement
made by any party." 10
In 1996, the Ohio Supreme Court's Rules Advisory Committee revisited
the issue and published for comment a new version of Ohio Rule 68.111 The
proposed rule covered offers by both plaintiffs and defendants; under this
proposed rule if the plaintiff's unaccepted offer was more favorable than the
relief obtained by the plaintiff at trial, then the plaintiff would be awarded
double costs. 112 The accompanying staff note described the earlier staff
note's fear of one-sided, coercive settlements as "difficult to measure" and
CIVIL PRACTICE § 68:1 (2010); 8 OHIO JURISPRUDENCE PLEADING & PRACTICE FORMS §
80:1 (West 2009).
107 OHIO R. Civ. P. 68.
108 OHIO R. Civ. P. 68, staff note ("In addition, Rule 68 has effectively repealed §§
2311.14 through 2311.20, R.C. These statutes, like Federal Rule 68, also permitted the
use of the offer of judgment as the basis of a costs proceeding.").
109 OHIO R. CIv. P. 68, staff note.
110 Ohio R. Civ. P. 68.
111 See Michael E. Solimine & Bryan Pacheco, State Court Regulation of Offers of
Judgment and its Lessons for Federal Practice, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 51, 66
(1997).
112 See id. at 66-67.
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based wholly upon anecdotal evidence. 1 3 The proposal was opposed by a
group of plaintiffs' lawyers, the Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, and
ultimately the Ohio Supreme Court withdrew the proposal. 114
IV. THE INTERACTION OF OFFERS OF JUDGMENT AND MEDIATION
A. Federal Rule 68 and Mediation
While the operation of Federal Rule 68 is relatively clear when a case
proceeds to trial, what happens if the case does not go to trial and resolves
after a Federal Rule 68 offer expires due to settlement? In such cases where
the plaintiff obtains a favorable judgment, Federal Rule 54 would
customarily allow the plaintiff to recover costs. 115 Nonetheless, some courts
insist that Federal Rule 68 does not apply unless the plaintiff's judgment is
obtained after trial. 116 This approach has been characterized as flawed
because a judgment entered pursuant to a settlement has been "obtained" by
plaintiff if it is favorable to the plaintiff.117 Additionally, applying the rule
encourages defendants to make Federal Rule 68 offers that are reasonable in
the sense that they are more favorable than settlements subsequently
accepted by plaintiffs. Indeed, Federal Rule 68 is undercut if it is not applied
to cases that ultimately settle because most cases do settle short of trial.1 18 To
113 Id. The proposal with an accompanying proposed staff note was published as an
appendix to Solimine & Pacheco, supra note 111, at 82-87.
114 See Solimine & Pacheco, supra note 111, at 68-69. Ohio will be revisiting the
offer of judgment issue. Ohio State Senator Eric Kearney recently introduced a bill to
request the Ohio Supreme Court to amend Ohio Rule 68 to more closely mirror Federal
Rule 68. See S. B. No. 52, 129th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011). Whether the bill
passes or not, the Ohio Supreme Court's Commission on the Rules of Practice &
Procedure intends to reexamine the issue and has placed Ohio Rule 68 on this year's
agenda.
115 See 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3006 (2d ed. 2010).
116 See Good Timez, Inc. v. Phoenix Fire & Marine Ins., 754 F. Supp. 459, 461-63
(D.V.I. 1991) (holding that a plaintiff's right to seek post-offer costs and fees was not
extinguished after the plaintiff rejected a Federal Rule 68 offer that was identical to the
ultimate settlement reached because Federal Rule 68 only applies where the final
judgment is obtained after trial); Hutchison v. Wells, 719 F. Supp. 1435, 1442-44 (D.
Ind. 1989) (holding that the rejection of a Federal Rule 68 offer and the later acceptance
of identical offer did not cut off entitlement to costs because case did not go to trial).
117 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 115.
118 Id.
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encourage defendants to make realistic offers of judgment, and to make
plaintiffs seriously contemplate such offers, Federal Rule 68 should apply
where a settlement is later made on less favorable terms than those in a
rejected Federal Rule 68 offer. 119
B. Michigan Rule Contemplating Interaction Between Mediation and
Offer of Judgment
The Michigan legislature passed rules in the 1980s for both mandatory
case evaluation and offer of judgment, both with cost-shifting if a party did
not do better in the final judgment than was recommended or offered.' 2 0
"Case evaluation"'121 is intended to go first and a court can require the parties
to participate in a hearing before a panel of three evaluators. Each trial court
maintains a list of persons who meet the eligibility requirements to be an
evaluator. One requirement is to have been a practicing lawyer for at least
five years with a substantial proportion of work devoted to civil litigation. 122
A judge can be a member of the panel, but in such instances, the usual $75
fee is lowered to $50.123 Parties have the right to attend but are not required
119 See Lang v. Gates, 36 F.3d 73, 76 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding Federal Rule 68
should apply to a case that settled because such an application would deter the plaintiff's
attorney from rejecting a reasonable offer of judgment and pursuing further litigation).
120 MCR 2.403 (Case Evaluation) and MCR 2.405 (Offers to Stipulate to Entry of
Judgment).
121 The term "mediation" was originally used for this process, but the terminology
was changed in 2000 to "case evaluation." "Mediation evaluation," as it was originally
called, was not a true mediation process since it involved a decision by the evaluators,
much more akin to early neutral evaluation or court-annexed arbitration. The comment to
the 2000 change observed: "'Mediation' will be used to describe the facilitative process
established in MCR 2.411, in keeping with the generally accepted usage of the term."
MCR 2.405, staff comment to 2000 Amendment. The rules governing mediation under
MCR 2.411 do not provide for cost-shifting.
122 MCR 2.404(B)(2).
123 MCR 2.403(H)(1). The Michigan "case evaluation" rules have many of the
attributes of "Early Neutral Evaluation" (ENE) or "Court-Annexed Arbitration" programs
that were adopted in the 1970s and 80s in many state and federal courts. "Under ENE, a
neutral-usually a respected lawyer with expertise in the subject matter of the case-
meets with the parties and their lawyers for a couple of hours not long after the filing of
the case and gives them a frank assessment of their cases .... ENE provides a fairly
pristine form of 'evaluative' ADR. Although the outside attorney may facilitate
discussion, her principal role is to hear each side's case and give them an objective
assessment. Unlike mediation, both the presentations and the evaluation tend to be
couched in terms of the legal issues." RAu, SHERMAN & PEPPET, supra note 5, at 534.
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to do so, the rules of evidence do not apply, and oral presentations are limited
to fifteen minutes per side. 124 Within fourteen days, the panel makes an
evaluation that includes an award of damages. 125
Provisions for cost-shifting if the panel's decision is not accepted by
parties who do not do better at trial gives this non-binding evaluation a much
stronger imperative than many of the non-binding ADR devices with which
courts have experimented.1 26 The cost-shifting provision reads:
If a party has rejected an evaluation and the action proceeds to a
verdict, that party must pay the opposing party's actual costs
unless the verdict is more favorable to the rejecting party than the
case evaluation. However, if the opposing party has also rejected
the evaluation, a party is entitled to costs only if the verdict is more
favorable to that party than the case evaluation. 127
The rules go on to state that a verdict is considered "more favorable" if it
is more than 10% below or above the evaluation.128 The costs to be shifted
are costs taxable in any civil action and "a reasonable attorney fee based on a
reasonable hourly or daily rate as determined by the trial judge for services
Under court-annexed arbitration (sometimes called "non-binding arbitration"), three
neutral attorneys typically serve for a nominal fee in a hearing where each side presents
its case in an abbreviated form and the arbitrators render a non-binding decision. Id. at
535-43; ROBERT J. NIEMIC, DONNA STIENSTRA & RANDALL E. RAVITZ, GUIDE TO
JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN ADR 9 (Federal Judicial Center 2001).
124 MCR 2.403(J).
125 MCR 2.403(K).
126 Some court-annexed arbitration programs impose a small monetary penalty on
parties who do not accept the non-binding decision, but these amounts are small
compared to the cost-shifting available under Michigan case evaluation. Such penalties
have been criticized as undercutting the voluntariness of non-binding ADR and infringing
the right to jury trial. See Stacey Keare, Reducing the Costs of Civil Litigation:
Alternative Dispute Resolution, UC HASTINGS PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH INST., Fall 1995,
http://w3.uchastings.edu/plri/fa195tex/adr.html ("Assessing penalties on parties who go
on to trial after using ADR would certainly save money for the state by decreasing the
number of disputes that go on to trial. For this reason several U.S. District Courts use
such penalties. However, this avenue approaches coercion and therefore imposes
substantial stress on the right to a jury trial. Given that ADR was first conceived to
reduce the cost of courts and increase the speed of trials, this method does not seem to
serve the goal of improving access to the justice system.").
127 MCR 2.403(O)(1).
128 MCR 2.403(0)(3).
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necessitated by the rejection of the case evaluation."'129 However, "costs shall
not be awarded if the case evaluation award was not unanimous."' 130
The Michigan case evaluation rules provide much stronger coercive
penalties than Federal Rule 68. Participation in case evaluation is mandatory
if the court so orders; both parties are subjected to the cost-shifting
possibilities; if a party rejects the evaluation, it will be subjected to cost-
shifting if it does not do at least 10% better in the final judgment than in the
evaluation; and the cost-shifting includes actual costs plus attorney's fees. 131
One might think that such a strong rule would not require further incentives
to encourage parties to settle. But coupled with the case evaluation rule is a
rule for offers to stipulate to an entry of judgment. 132 It provides that either
party, up to 28 days before trial, may make a written offer of judgment "for
the whole or part of the claim, including interest and costs then accrued."'1 33
If an offer is rejected, costs are shifted as follows:
(1) If the adjusted verdict is more favorable to the offeror than the
average offer, the offeree must pay to the offeror the offeror's
actual costs incurred in the prosecution or defense of the
action.
(2) If the adjusted verdict is more favorable to the offeree than the
average offer, the offeror must pay to the offeree the offeree's
actual costs incurred in the prosecution or defense of the
action. However, an offeree who has not made a counteroffer
may not recover actual costs unless the offer was made less
than 42 days before trial.
(3) The court shall determine the actual costs incurred. The court
may, in the interest of justice, refuse to award an attorney fee
under this rule. 13 4
These cost-shifting provisions sound a good deal like those for rejection
of a case evaluation under the Michigan rules. 135 What does offer of
judgment cost-shifting add to case evaluation cost-shifting? Offer of
129 MCR 2.403(O)(6).
130 MCR 2.403(0)(7).
131 MCR 2.403(0)(3).
132 MCR 2.405.
133 MCR 2.405(B).
134 MCR 2.405(D)(1)-(3).
135 MCR 2.403(0).
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judgment provides an additional incentive by allowing either party to make
an actual offer to settle. A party who has refused the evaluation would
already be subject to the cost-shifting provisions of the case evaluation rules.
However, because one or both parties may be unhappy with the case
evaluation number, further negotiations involving concrete offers are
necessary to actually accomplish a settlement. Offer of judgment allows
either party to make a concrete offer, which may not be the same as the
number in the evaluation. Even if parties are not prepared to accept the case
evaluation number at the time of the evaluation, they may be able to come
together later after having a chance to reflect and the exchange of offers of
judgment then narrows the difference between them. Offer of judgment thus
provides an additional mechanism for fine-tuning a settlement number that
one party can make to the other (and the other can fine-tune with a counter-
offer). Case evaluation by three attorneys who have spent only a couple of
hours hearing an abbreviated description of the case may not be the ideal last
word on what the case is worth. The offer of judgment rule thus provides an
additional means of pressuring the parties to reach agreement through the
exchange of offers.
While there may be a valid reason to have an offer of judgment process,
in addition to the cost-shifting provisions of case evaluation, the interplay
between the two incentive systems can cause difficulties. This became
apparent in Michigan, necessitating an amendment to the rule.136 The
original offer of judgment rule provided that where there has been a rejection
of both a case evaluation award and an offer of judgment, "the cost-shifting
provisions of the rule under which the later rejection occurred control."'1 37
This seemed to be an attempt to encourage parties to make offers of
judgment, even after rejection of case evaluation. But this led to
complications, as described by the Michigan Supreme Court:
[T]he offer of judgment procedure gives a party a way of avoiding
mediation sanctions, or at least of substituting the potential for
offer of judgment sanctions, which may be more favorable to that
party. The typical situation is one in which Party A has accepted
the mediation award (and thus cannot be subject to sanctions), but
Party R has rejected, and would be potentially liable for sanctions
if an unfavorable verdict ultimately results. The offer of judgment
procedure gives R an opportunity to make A potentially subject to
136 MCR 2.405(E) (amended Oct. 1, 1997).
137Id.
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offer of judgment sanctions, and to avoid such vulnerability itself
if A does not make a counteroffer. 138
In response to this concern, the provision on the relationship between
the two rules was amended in 1997 to read as follows:
Relationship to Case Evaluation. Costs may not be awarded
under this rule in a case that has been submitted to case evaluation
under MCR 2.403 unless the case evaluation award was not
unanimous. 139
With this change, cost-shifting pursuant to the offer of judgment rule would
no longer control unless the case evaluation award was not unanimous. The
intent of this change was "to reduce gamesmanship" by making it clear that
"the offer of judgment costs provision should be used only in conjunction
with [case evaluation] where a [case evaluation] award was not unanimous
and thus case evaluation sanctions were not available under MCR 2.403.140
Although the amendment to the rule reduced the potential for a party
who rejected a case evaluation award to undercut that award by making an
offer of judgment, some Michigan cases have given a narrow interpretation
of the amendment when a later offer of judgment does not reflect
gamesmanship. For example, in Reitmeyer v. Schultz Equipment & Parts
Co.,141 the case evaluation panel unanimously awarded plaintiff $17,500.142
The defendant accepted it, and the plaintiff failed to respond (which is taken
as a rejection). Thereafter plaintiff made an offer of judgment of $27,000,
and defendant made a counteroffer of $18,000 which plaintiff rejected.143
After trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff $27,013. The plaintiff had done
better than his offer of $27,000 and the defendant's counteroffer of $18,000,
and so he filed a motion for offer of judgment sanctions and attorney's fees
138 STATE OF MICH., REPORT OF SUPREME COURT MEDIATION RULE COMMITTEE, 451
Mich. 1205, 1232-33 (1996) (as amended by the Committee in their report of December
15, 1995).
139 MCR 2.405(E).
140 Stitt v. Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 624 N.W.2d 427, 434 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2000).
141 Reitmeyer v. Schultz Equip. & Parts Co., 602 N.W.2d 596, 598 (Mich. Ct. App.
1999).
142 Id.
143 Id.
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totaling $10,689.45. The trial court denied it, relying on the amended rule
that denies sanctions where a mediation award was not unanimous. 144
The Michigan Court of Appeals viewed the purpose of the amendment as
"attempting to eliminate the gamesmanship of using the offer of judgment
rule as a way to avoid [case evaluation] sanctions while opening the
possibility for offer of judgment sanctions, without a good faith intent to
settle the case." 145 The fact that the jury award of $27,013 was nearly the
same figure as the plaintiff's offer of judgment of $27,000 suggested that the
offer of judgment was not used merely for gamesmanship.' 46 It quoted
language from the Michigan Supreme Court in adopting the amendment that
"there are instances in which a [case evaluation] award is unrealistic and thus
will not contribute to settlement of the case. In those circumstances,
substitution of a more reasonable offer of judgment value can promote
settlement."'147 The case was remanded to determine whether plaintiffs
actions were merely gamesmanship to avoid case evaluation sanctions, or a
reasonable offer conducive to settlement.1 48 Thus the court recognized the
additional incentive to a fair settlement that can result from offer of judgment
cost-shifting, even where the case evaluation was rejected.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF COST-SHIFTING RULES
A. Changes to Federal Rule 68 and State Counterparts
Changes in Federal Rule 68 (and its state court counterparts) could
enhance its potential for encouraging settlement. The offer of judgment will
remain an underutilized procedural tool for settlement as long as its inherent
limitations remain. Both parties should have the right to make offers.
However, as the state experience demonstrates, bilateral application alone
may not spur use. What incentive exists for a plaintiff to make an offer of
judgment when the only available sanction against a defendant is the costs
the plaintiff is already entitled to under Rule 54? Additional encouragement
is necessary.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 601.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 602 (quoting Report of Supreme Court Rule Committee, 451 Mich. 1205,
1233 (1996)).
14 8 Reitmeyer, 602 N.W.2d at 598.
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One possibility is to incorporate the double costs provision of states like
Minnesota and impose a heightened sanction on defendants who reject offers
that turn out to be better than the result at trial. 149 At first glance, the double
cost award to plaintiffs may appear inequitable and unduly punitive.
However, considering the effects of a rejected offer on a plaintiff-payment
of defendant's post-offer costs and loss of plaintiffs own costs incurred after
the rejection-the burden of double costs on the defendant may be
appropriate. 150
Yet costs, even double costs, may fail to motivate litigants.' 51 As an
additional incentive, attorney's fees should be included in offer of judgment
rules. As state experience reflects, inclusion of attorney's fees as part of the
cost-shifting sanction would increase use of the Federal Rule 68, resolve
cases more quickly, and decrease the costs of litigation. 152 If there are
concerns that inclusion of attorney's fees is too draconian a measure, any risk
could be tempered by a safety valve provision allowing judicial discretion to
prevent undue hardship 153 or use of a margin of error provision.154 Extending
the right to make an offer to both parties and including attorney's fees in the
costs that are shifted would alter the fact that Federal Rule 68 is rarely used
today.
149 See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
150 See S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 308 (7th
Cir. 1995) ("Since as a prevailing party the plaintiff would be entitled to an award of
costs anyway, doubling them provides a sanction equivalent to that imposed on a plaintiff
who turns down a settlement offer by the defendant and then does worse at trial.").
151 There is no precision in predicting what dollar amount is necessary to spur party
motivation to settle. In fact, there is little quantitative data on what costs even amount to
in federal litigation. See Lynch, supra note 51, at 355.
152 Yoon & Baker, supra note 48, at 159 ("Our results reveal that while the relative
average damage award in New Jersey did not undergo any statistically significant change
after the rule was revised, suits in that state took less time to resolve by an average of 2.3
months, or roughly 7 percent. This reduction in litigation duration affected all quartiles of
damage awards, with a statistically robust effect on all but the highest quartile.
Correspondingly, shorter litigation periods translated into a decrease in the insurers'
attorney's fees by an average of nearly $1,200, or approximately 20 percent. These
findings suggest that allowing a substantial cost-shifting mechanism would be an
effective means of increasing the efficacy of offer-of-judgment rules.").
153 See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing Minnesota provision on
undue hardship).
154 See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing Texas provision on
margin of error).
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B. Changes to Federal Rule 16
Including consideration of offers of judgment or settlement as part of
case management directed at encouraging settlement would enhance its
effectiveness. Federal Rule 16 already authorizes federal district courts to
hold pretrial conferences to expedite the disposition of cases and facilitate
settlement.1 55 Pretrial scheduling conferences conducted by a federal district
judge or magistrate judge under Federal Rule 16(b) also provide an ideal
time to raise the potential of a Federal Rule 68 offer of judgment. Federal
Rule 16(b) could be amended to explicitly include Federal Rule 68 in the list
of topics to be discussed. This would certainly eliminate concerns that some
lawyers simply overlook the potential of Federal Rule 68.156 In cases where
fee-shifting statutes raise the stakes of Federal Rule 68, Federal Rule 16
allows an opportunity for the parties and the court to carefully consider how
the attorney's fees component impacts a Federal Rule 68 offer.
C. Changes in Local Rules
A similar benefit could be achieved when court-ordered mediation is
used. Either by local rule or as part of a mediator's checklist, mediators could
be instructed to consider the impact of a Federal Rule 68 offer in their
facilitation of the mediation. As with the Federal Rule 16 modification, this
minor change in practice serves to educate the parties on the potential of
Federal Rule 68 offers. 157 If there is a genuine fear that Federal Rule 68
offers are being ignored by lawyers for economic reasons, this change in
mediator practice would certainly reduce, if not eliminate, such concerns.
Even if defense counsel prefers to continue the hourly billing of a defendant
and might have an incentive to withhold suggesting use of Federal Rule 68,
counsel would be forced to deal with it if the mediator raised the issue during
a caucus with the defendant and counsel present. Similarly, if a plaintiffs
lawyer was inclined violate the ethical obligation to the client and withhold
transmission of a Federal Rule 68 offer to the plaintiff, the open discussion of
155 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a).
156 See Symposium, supra note 24 at 785-86 (noting that Professor Harold Lewis
suggested that Federal Rule 16(b) may be useful in facilitating discussion of Rule 68
offers).
157 See id. (suggesting the reform).
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a Federal Rule 68 offer in a mediation caucus would keep that temptation at
bay. 15 8
Attaching the offer of judgment process to mediation would provide a
sanction regime that the mediation process lacks. The concern may be raised
that this would undercut voluntariness by introducing coercion, but the
coercion arises not from participation in the mediation but from the addition
of the offer of judgment incentive to settle. Requiring parties to respond to
offers is not a proper part of a mediation and a "good faith participation"'
159
requirement that contemplates sanctions for failure to respond in good faith
could indeed subvert the voluntariness of mediation. But if mediation does
not accomplish a settlement, there would be no reason not to invoke an offer
of judgment to encourage parties to bring their offers and counteroffers
closer together. The Michigan experience of having two cost-shifting
regimes shows that, despite some difficulties of administration, cost-shifting
can provide a strong inducement to settlement. 160 Attaching the offer of
settlement process to mediation does not raise the same problems of
reconciling two different cost-shifting regimes as in Michigan and should be
even easier to administer.
D. A Case Evaluation Process to Complement Offers of Judgment
A case evaluation process, like that used in Michigan, that includes cost-
shifting if parties refuse the evaluation, could add an additional incentive to
settle. We do not favor attaching cost-shifting or sanctions to mediation
orders. Michigan amended its rule to replace the term "mediation evaluation"
with "case evaluation" in appreciation of the fact that mediation is a
facilitative process that is inconsistent with sanctions for failure to settle. As
reflected by the debate over imposition of sanctions for failure to participate
"in good faith" in mediation, sanctions related to failure to settle threaten the
voluntary and facilitative nature of mediation. Only sanctions for failure to
meet "minimum participation requirements" (such as not attending, not
bringing certain documents as ordered, or complete failure to listen to the
other side or make minimal responses) should be sanctionable.1 61 However,
158 Professor Lewis, who had surveyed lawyers on the desirability of changes to
Federal Rule 68 reports that "[a]s a whole the group was moderately supportive to
strongly supportive, even among defense counsel." Id. at 786.
159 See supra notes 9-11.
160 See supra Part IV.B (detailing Michigan experience).
161 See Sherman, supra note 10, at 2112 ("A 'good faith participation' requirement
is not compatible with the objectives of court-annexed ADR and risks satellite litigation
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cost-shifting mechanisms that are part of case evaluation or offer of judgment
processes can provide stronger incentives to settle and, properly applied, are
useful adjuncts to mediation in a court's role in promoting settlement.
VI. CONCLUSION
Federal Rule 68 and state offer of judgment rules modeled after it are
destined to remain underutilized tools for settlement unless changes are
made. The experience of states like Minnesota and Michigan provide
considerable guidance. The scope of Federal Rule 68 must be broadened to
allow plaintiffs to make offers and to allow the shifting of attorney's fees
under certain circumstances. The potential use of Federal Rule 68 should be
discussed during pretrial conferences, and Federal Rule 16 can be easily
amended to make this explicit. Similarly, mediators should be instructed to
consider the impact of Federal Rule 68 in their facilitation of court-connected
mediation. While attaching cost-shifting directly to orders to mediate is
unwise, adoption of a case evaluation process with cost-shifting provides the
promise of additional incentives to settle. If implemented, the changes
suggested here would allow offer of judgment rules and mediation practice to
work in tandem to encourage settlement.
over sanctions that is inimical to effective and efficient settlement. In contrast,
participation requirements for the exchange of position papers and objective information
enhance the settlement process without unduly interfering with litigant autonomy.
Similarly, a 'minimal meaningful participation' standard that requires only such
participation as is needed to prevent frustration of the objectives of the particular ADR
process is consistent with the role of ADR in the litigation system. Requirements for
attendance of parties and persons with adequate authority and discretion are also critical
to the settlement function of court-annexed ADR, but must be applied pragmatically to
protect against unnecessary expense and inconvenience.").
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